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Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness
Gabriel Fernandez-Borsot1

Universitat Internacional de Catalunya
Barcelona, Spain
Otherness has been a subject of the utmost relevance for continental philosophy
since the beginning of the 20th century, constituting what might be characterized
as an otherness turn. Otherness is here understood as the awareness that one has
that other beings or things have their own separate beingness that is not subsumed
within oneself. Its essential role in human relations permits the creation of a critical
perspective of analysis, a “lens of otherness.” Applying this lens to perennialism up
through its latest iterations reveals some problematic aspects of this approach. By
contrast, participatory thought may be a more “otherness compliant” alternative to
perennialism. Whereas perennialism can be seen as being geared toward theoretical
unification, participatory approaches are arguably guided by an ethos of otherness.
Otherness is thus advanced as a relevant aspect in the debate on perennialism,
and participatory thought is proposed as a more viable philosophical frame for
transpersonal studies.
Keywords: otherness, perennialism, transpersonal theory,
lens of otherness, continental philosophy

T

he public sphere is flooded with a variety of
scintillating offers in the interface between
spirituality and psychology. Common to many
approaches is the assumption that the experience
of oneness is the highest spiritual realization and
indeed the ultimate goal of spiritual development.
An example of this can be found in popularized neoAdvaitan discourse, in which the meaning of advaita
as “not two” is emphasized (e.g., Katz, 2007). The
term “nondual” tries to capture this same idea: that
oneness or unity is the key (Hartelius, 2017b).
Transforming metaphysical theories of
oneness into a unified theory of spirituality is an
alluring temptation for scholars who wish to regard
human spirituality as something more substantive
than social constructions invented to explain
psychological aberrations. In the early decades
of transpersonal theory, for example, emphasis
on unification led to a privileging of perennialist
positions. During the last 20 years perennialism has
been criticized and deconstructed in the course
of a heated debate, and at least one substantive
alternative—participatory philosophy—has been
proposed (Abramson, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Alderman,

2011, 2012a, 2012b; Ferrer, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2008,
2011a, 2011b, 2017; Hartelius, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a,
2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Hartelius & Ferrer,
2013; Taylor, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
The debate on perennialism has focused on
matters such as the Cartesian-Kantian split (Ferrer,
2002), the metaphysical nature of its basic assertions
(Abramson, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Hartelius, 2015a,
2015b, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Taylor, 2016,
2017a, 2017b, 2017c), and the circular nature of the
arguments on the supporting evidence (Hartelius,
2017b). However, an overlooked issue—the
need for an effective account of otherness within
perennialist thought—may have influenced both
the evolution of perennialist thought and the rise of
a participatory alternative. In order to expand the
critique of perennialism, the concept of otherness as
developed within Western continental philosophy
during the 20th century can be brought to bear. For
instance, Levinas’s (1961) notion of “imperialism
of the Same,” his affirmation that ethics and not
ontology must be the first philosophy (Levinas,
1984/1989), and his analysis of the tension between
“Totality and Infinity” (Levinas, 1961), gather
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valuable insights about otherness that expose
shadows in perennialist thought. In this way, what
might be termed an otherness turn in continental
philosophy may find application in transpersonal
thought, calling for an otherness vigilance that
allows theories to be scrutinized to detect where
aspects of otherness have been neglected or
inadequately integrated. In this paper, I describe a
method of critical analysis based on otherness, or
a “lens of otherness,” and apply this lens to both
perennialism and participatory thought so as to
identify additional problematic aspects of perennial
views that participatory approaches may help to
resolve (Fernandez-Borsot, 2017). In addition, the
analysis highlights the need for explicit consideration
of otherness in transpersonal thought.
As a working definition, otherness is here
understood as the awareness that one has that
other beings or things have their own separate
beingness that is neither subsumed within oneself,
nor is absolutely other (cf. Treanor, 2006). Instead,
it implies an understanding that self and other
are continually shaped by their engagement with
each other. While many definitions of otherness
are possible, this relational understanding of the
term is congruent with the critique of perennialism
advanced in this discussion.
In this discussion, a variety of cultural
constructs related to spirituality, such as spiritual
traditions, religions, worldviews, beliefs systems,
cosmologies, and so on, are indicated by the term
spiritual frame. I adopt Ferrer’s (2002) classification
of perennialism in five varieties: basic, esotericist,
structuralist, perspectivist and typological (see pp.
77–80)—a classification that sufficiently covers the
spectrum of perennialist theories inside and outside
of transpersonal studies. While the latest generation
of perennialist approaches (Rose, 2016; Studstill,
2005; Taylor, 2016) may not seem to fit wholly within
this taxonomy, Taylor (2016) has correctly placed
them in the perspectivist category (pp. 19, 35),
though with distinctive features that are discussed
below.
The Perennialist Debate: The Context
erennialism is a philosophy of spirituality based
upon the following set of assumptions:

Some important problematic aspects of
these assumptions have been already analyzed indepth in the transpersonal community (Ferrer, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2017; Hartelius,
2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c;
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013), and here I limit my analysis
to the perspective of otherness. From this point of
view, the two most problematic assumptions are,
first, the pretension that it is possible to establish a
universal spiritual doctrine that somehow unifies the
diversity of spiritual frames; I call this the theoretical
unification attempt. Second is the assumption
that the ultimate goal or end point of spiritual
development can be directly experienced, and that
once that has been experienced there is no further
realization to be obtained; I call this the ultimacy
claim.
Perennialism presents a variety of versions,
as noted by Ferrer (2002), but all of them share
these set of assumptions, although with different
emphasis and more or less sophisticated epistemic
articulations. During the last decade some new
versions of perennialism have appeared that might
seem to not comply with all the assumptions, most
of them outside the transpersonal arena (Rose, 2016;
Studstill, 2005), and one within it: Taylor’s (2016)
soft perennialism (discussed later).
Perennialism is a long-lasting philosophy
whose origins in the Western tradition trace back
to at least the Neoplatonism of Philo of Alexandria
or the Platonic-Christian synthesis of St. Augustine
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1. There is a fundamental unity underlying all
spiritual frames.
2. This unity can be somehow captured in specific
formulations, descriptions, representations, or
doctrines.
3. The reason this capture is possible is because
there is an ultimate fixed referent for all spiritual
or transpersonal experiences, which can be
object of direct experience and therefore object
of knowledge articulation that is universally
valid.
4. The direct experience of this ultimate referent is
the ultimate goal of spiritual development and
its ending-point, the highest spiritual realization,
the end of the human quest.

(Ferrer, 2002, p. 73). After that, it was developed
in the transition from the medieval period into the
Renaissance with the works of Nicolas de Cusa
and the Neoplatonic Florentine Academy (with
Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola; Schmitt,
1966). The first to use the term was the 16thcentury Catholic scholar Agostino Steuco. The
influence of perennialism in transpersonal theory
came through its flourishing in the first part of the
20th century through the work of traditionalist
scholars such as René Guenon (2001) and Frithjof
Schuon (e.g., 1953/1984), the adaptations of
Eastern philosophy by Swami Vivekananda (1947)
and Ananda Coomaraswamy (2019), the esoteric
teachings of the theosophical society (Blavatsky,
1888/1978), and most remarkably Aldous Huxley’s
(1945) popularization of the perennial philosophy.
Further articulations of perennialism that influenced
transpersonal thinkers can be found in the works
of outstanding scholars such as Joseph Campbell
(1949) and Huston Smith (1958).
Perennialism crystalized into transpersonal
theory through the work of Ken Wilber (1977, 1979,
1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001a,
2001b, 2001c). Wilber’s work was so influential
during the first decades of transpersonal psychology
that his ideas shaped the basic theoretical foundations
of the field, so that a perennialist-like hierarchical
ontology became its most prevalent philosophical
framework (Rothberg, 1986), with nonhierarchical
models not so much “alternative as complementary
to a hierarchical ontology” (p. 24). Wilber’s paradigm
reigned until the end of the 20th century, and though
it started to be questioned in the late 1980s (e.g.,
Washburn, 1988), it was not until the end of the
1990s that it received a critique substantial enough
to dethrone it (see Heron, 1996; Rothberg & Kelly,
1998). The most incisive and influential critique
arguably came from Ferrer’s early work (1998, 2000,
2002), which was partly directed at overcoming the
flaws inherent in Wilber’s perennialism. Since then,
the debates around perennialism in transpersonal
psychology have been multiple and heated at
times. Arguably, perennialism has been the topic
that has entertained more philosophical discussion
in the field. The aim of this paper is to contribute
to that discussion, responding to the call issued by
Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness

Lancaster and Friedman (2017), and adding to the
debate the perspective of otherness.
Otherness in Continental Philosophy:
The Otherness Turn
fter centuries of Western philosophy in which
metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology
played a hegemonic role, the beginning of the
20th century witnessed a pivotal turn with the
irruption of Husserl’s phenomenology (1900/1970a,
1901/1970b, 1931/1977). Husserl’s purpose was to
study first-person conscious experience. Husserl’s
project quickly revealed to him the essential role of
intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 1996), and he concluded
that first-person experience is not independent
from second-person or third-person phenomena.
Otherness, the first-person awareness of other
subjects and objects that are different from the
self that is aware of them, made its appearance
as a topic of utmost relevance. Otherness, as a
condition of possibility for intersubjectivity and as
a fundamental function in the psyche, was revealed
to be foundational to experience (Zahavi, 1996,
1999, 2014). By emphasizing intersubjectivity,
and the implicit presence of otherness, Husserl
inaugurated a wide venue of work within the
phenomenological tradition and beyond: the role of
“the other” in the psychological and sociocultural
life. Many brilliant thinkers put otherness at the core
of their philosophical analyses: Sartre (1943) viewed
the self as vicariously receiving its being from its
relationships with others—and therefore subject
to their judgement—leading to the experience
that “hell is other people” (Sartre, 1944/2015);
Merleau-Ponty (1960/1964, 1945/2013) approached
otherness from a somatic stance; Heidegger
(1927/1962, p. 149) emphasized the relational
nature of being, captured in his famous statement
“Dasein ist Mitsein” (Being is being-with); Levinas
(1961, 1974, 1984/1989, 1991/1998, 1995/1999)
focused on otherness as the long ignored central
topic of philosophy that dethroned metaphysics
and ontology and rehabilitated ethics as the core
philosophy; Marcel (1964) insisted on relative
otherness as opposed to Absolute Otherness;
Derrida (1967/1976, 1967/1978) playfully noted that
“tout autre est tout autre” (“every other is wholly
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other”) to illustrate his notion of différance; Ricoeur
(1990/1992) viewed the self as interwoven with the
other through narratives; Kearney (2003) analyzed
the hermeneutic of otherness; Foucault (1973, 1994a,
1994b) critiqued the othering process effected
through knowledge construction and the associated
normative prescriptions; Deleuze (1994) subverted
the traditional relationship between identity and
difference. This list merely samples the range of
positions inspired by the centrality of otherness.
The intellectual current created by
the reflections on otherness has overstepped
the boundaries of philosophy and entered the
discourse of many other disciplines: Lacanian
psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1977, 1998), intersubjective
psychoanalysis (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, 1992),
relational psychoanalysis (Greenberg & Mitchell,
1983; Mitchell & Aron, 1999), sociology (Bauman,
1991; Jenkins, 1996), education (Freire, 1970),
anthropology (Leistle, 2015), and cultural analyses
(Docherty, 1996; Jervis 1999), to name a few.
Moreover, the increased awareness of the
relevance of otherness that continental philosophy
brought during the 20th century flourished in a variety
of critical perspectives in social sciences. Each one
of these critical perspectives focused in one aspect
of human life that served as basis for othering: race
(Crenshaw et al., 1995), class (Ferguson et al., 1990),
gender (Benjamin, 1998; De Beauvoir, 1949/2008;
Irigaray, 1993a, 1993b), colonization (Ferguson et
al., 1990; Said, 1993), cultural recognition (Taylor,
1992), cultural expression (Docherty, 1996), cultural
differences (Jervis, 1999), and even geographical
analyses (Duncan, 1993; Staszak, 2009). These
perspectives illustrate how the social construction
of otherness can be used to oppress and exploit
individuals and communities.
In this way, the 20th century saw a
progressive prominence of otherness in philosophy—
an otherness turn which then permeated into social
sciences and cultural analyses—in synergy with the
linguistic turn. This otherness turn has increased
awareness of the relevance of otherness, and of
the oppression and abuse that can be involved in
the social processes of othering. The lessons of
the otherness turn can be summarized in three
ideas:
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1. Otherness is a core dimension of human experience, both at the individual and collective
levels.
2. There has been a historical tendency in Western
society to use ideas, discourses, arguments, and
ideologies to oppress and marginalize the individuals, communities, cultures, and worldviews
whose features do not adhere to established
normative models.
3. Therefore, any commitment against oppression
and marginalization requires ethical otherness
vigilance.
The emerging prominence of otherness
as a foundational aspect of humanness may
well constitute the basis for development of a
specific critical perspective of analysis capable of
discerning whether otherness has been neglected or
inadequately integrated into a given theory. However,
before such a lens of otherness can be engaged, it
is necessary to consider whether otherness should
be conceived in absolute or relative terms. While
this might seem an obscure distinction, it will be
shown to have sweeping impact on the ethical
impact of otherness integration. Absolute otherness
is otherness qua difference, that is, that difference
is defined only in separative terms, so that the only
constitutive aspect of otherness is difference. By
contrast, relative otherness is the view that otherness
occurs within a similarity-difference polarity, just as
the categories of self and other obtain their meaning
from reciprocal relationship with each other.
The 20th century saw an important
debate on this issue of absolute versus relative
otherness between Levinas (1987/1994, 1991/1998,
1995/1999) and Marcel (1951a, 1951b, 1964,
1965, 1995). Treanor’s (2006) extensive analysis
of this debate considered its ramifications in the
works of Derrida, Caputo, Ricoeur, and Kearney,
and concluded that absolute otherness is not a
viable philosophical position because it leads to
all sorts of aporias and contradictions. Extending
Treanor’s analysis, relative otherness is also a more
generative and useful framing of otherness for use
as a critical perspective of analysis for the social
sciences, since defining otherness in terms of a
similarity-difference polarity provides a pragmatic
Fernandez-Borsot

basis for understanding a variety of psychological
and social mechanisms. For example, closer to
the similarity pole one might locate dynamics of
identification, projection, empathy, symbiosis,
assimilation, reciprocity, resonance, communion,
shared worldview, shared values, shared cultural
traits, the construction of an “us,” syncretism, and
hybridization—concepts that would be difficult to
explain based on otherness as absolute, because
absolute otherness requires an absolute separation
that permits no continuum, and no relationship,
between similarity and difference. Likewise, the
aspect of the continuum weighted toward difference
can be seen in the dynamics of rejection, alienation,
marginalization, stigmatization, difference as threat,
competition, rivalry, and conflicts between cultures,
races, ethnicities, classes, genders, and social groups.
However, traces of similarity are also present in
experiences of difference as enrichment, difference
as complement, and difference as awesomeness—
common nuances that an absolute otherness would
not permit.
If otherness is to be employed as a critical
lens of analysis, then, it seems clear that it will need to
employ otherness in a relative rather than an absolute
sense. Relative otherness is not only more pragmatic,
as noted, but also more capable of cultivating the
sort of ethical discernments appropriate to critical
analysis. For example, Derrida’s (2000) analysis of
hospitality demonstrates the absurdity and distance
from common human experience that is introduced
by an absolute interpretation of the term. Derrida
claimed that any act of hospitality, because it is
relative and situationally conditioned rather than
absolute and unconditional, contains in itself a
primary act of hostility. This led him to coin the
expression “hostipitality,” reflecting a fundamental
distrust of human encounters (cf. Derrida &
Dufourmantelle, 2000). Yet this analysis emphasizes
only the restrictive nature of human bonds, and
denies their role in human relations, society, and the
individual and communal creativity that emerges
from these.
This lens of otherness finds application
not only within the social sciences generally, but
may have specific relevance for those approaches
within psychology that reach for an understanding
Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness

of spirituality as a natural expression of the human
person—humanistic, integral, and transpersonal
psychologies. For example, the topic of transcendence can be considered in either relative or
absolute terms. For Levinas (1990; Treanor, 2006),
the very enterprise of mysticism was a deceptive
pursuit of contact with the transcendent, since in
his interpretation of the transcendent as Absolute
Other, no such contact was even theoretically
possible. By contrast, just as it is possible to
situate otherness on a continuum that includes
both similarity and difference, transcendence can
be located on a continuum that extends from
immanence. Understood this way, transcendence
and immanence provide a relational spectrum
along which a variety of transpersonal notions can
be situated, spanning from phenomenal encounters
with immanent spiritual presence to metaphysical
concepts of a universal Absolute Other.
However, before applying the lens of
otherness to questions of human spirituality within
these more whole person approaches to psychology,
it is necessary to address a common objection.
Prevalent in some perennialist approaches such as
Wilber’s (2001b, 2007) integral theory and Grof’s
(1998) neo-Advaitin model is the idea that nondual
states of consciousness and their associated nondual
stages of development transcend all categories,
dichotomies, and dualities. Therefore, nonduality
transcends the limited duality that is implied with
otherness, and a perspective based in otherness
has no contribution to make to an ultimate that is
its superior source. However, the lens of otherness
is not in competition with nondual or perennialist
views for the position of dominant metatheory.
The lens of otherness is simply an analytical tool
that can be applied within the linguistic realm
where discussion of nondual states and stages takes
place; it can also be used to consider aspects of
such theories that may be problematic in terms of
their impact on psychological maturity, as well as
ethical personal and social relations. With these
preliminaries aside, the discussion turns to how a
lens of otherness perspective can contribute to the
analysis of perennialist thought within whole person
approaches—and specifically within transpersonal
studies.
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness:
An Imperialism of the Same
pplying the lens of otherness to the analysis
of perennialism brings to the forefront several
important problems. The first one concerns the
theoretical unification attempt. The aim of efforts
at theoretical unification among spiritual traditions
is to capture the essence of human spirituality.
Perennialist approaches attempt to create a universal map of “how things really are” in regard to
spirituality—that is, they make ontological claims
about the structure of cosmic reality reflected in
spiritual systems. Different versions of perennialism
map this alleged essence in various ways: (a) the
basic form offers a set of philosophical universal
principles; (b) the esotericist form describes a small
set of esoteric paths that remain consistent across
traditions, and that traverse a shared spiritual territory
in different ways to the same destination; (c) the
structuralist form discerns a set of deep structures
that characterize a universal spiritual developmental
path; (d) the perspectivist form portrays each path
as leading to a different facet of the same spiritual
ultimate; and (e) the typological form sees each
type of mysticism as a unique expression of a single
underlying spiritual reality (Ferrer, 2002).
Epistemic problems associated a CartesianKantian split implied in this map-like representational
approach, and the corresponding fall into the
myth of the given, have been extensively analysed
(Ferrer, 2002, 2017; see also Rorty, 1979). From the
perspective of otherness an additional critique can
be offered: any universal map of “how things are”
represents not only all the objects in the universe,
but also subsumes within a single representation the
myriad of differently located experiences of subjects
included in that expanse—that is, it assimilates
others into its own perspective without their
participation. Here Levinas’s (1984/1989) analysis on
the relationship between knowledge and otherness
applies. Levinas noted how Western philosophy
had embarked for centuries in a mapping process
that gave ontology and epistemology a prominent
role—a process in which the other is absorbed into
the same because the priority is to create functional
representations of the other instead of engaging with
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its otherness and being transformed in the process.
Treanor (2006) explained this point of Levinas:
when confronted with otherness, scientists,
explorers, philosophers, and theologians have
generally attempted to analyze the foreign phenomenon in order to learn something—indeed
ultimately everything—about it. This almost
invariably entails placing the other within a system
where it can be understood in juxtaposition to
other elements of the system. … Otherness is
thought in juxtaposition to, or in the terms of, the
same; otherness is other-than-the-same. The goal
is to convert something unknown (other) into
something known. (pp. 3–4)
This pressure exerted on otherness to conform
to how it has been represented is what Levinas
(1961) called the “imperialism of the Same,” which
carries out a systematic suppression of the Other.
This rejection of what is different and disturbing is
followed by an enforced assimilation of the other into
what is known and familiar. Western philosophy has
effected such an assimilation by placing ontology
(“how things are”) as first philosophy. Ontology as
it has been developed in the Western tradition is
focused on producing and refining an overarching
system rather than on attending carefully to unique
aspects that defy classification within the current
state of that system. Therefore, it cannot fully
accommodate the radical openness to the other
that ethics requires. In Levinas’s words (1984/1989),
if one is to respect the other, one must put “ethics
as first philosophy” (p. 75). If ontology is primary,
ethics will suffer. In this way, there is a previously
unexamined ethical liability of the perennialist
positions: its attempt to create a unified theory
incorporating all spiritual frames will necessarily
suppress otherness. The root of the problem lies
not in a particular version of perennialism, but in
the very attempt to create a theory about all beings
without the participation of all beings. What suffers
in perennialism is then hermeneutics—that is, the
depth of the other’s experience. The problem is
not with creating a model that integrates elements
of many spiritual frames, but with presenting it as
“the way things are,” as a reflection of the very
essence of spirituality. A unifying model could
Fernandez-Borsot

instead be presented as an invitation to exploration,
a hermeneutical container that provides guidance,
and a proposal to others that does not pretend to
already encompass them.
In addition to calling for ethics as first
philosophy, Levinas reflected a related idea in one
of his most celebrated works, Totality and Infinity
(1961). The dichotomy between totality and infinity
embodies the intrinsic tension between ontology
and the ethics required by otherness. Ontology
circumscribes being into a system, and what falls
outside the system is ignored (annihilated) or forced
to fit in (assimilated). Ontology, therefore, tends to
totalization. In contrast, otherness points to what
falls outside the current system, to infinity, to the
inexhaustible source of creativity and novelty in the
universe that overflows any attempt of establishing
a fixed system.
While the expressions “ethics as first
philosophy” and “totality and infinity” have become
emblematic of Levinas’s work, these are by no
means idiosyncratic aspects of his philosophy but
reflective of the larger otherness turn in Western
thought. For example, Dahnke (2001) showed that
Levinas’s articulation of these ideas represents the
maturation of ideas that were already prefigured in
Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger—and Crowell
(2015) added Sartre to the list. One can also find
further articulations of this strand of thought in those
he influenced, as with Derrida’s (1978) “violence
and metaphysics” (p. 97) or Vattimo’s “Belief”
(1999).
These core ideas of the otherness turn in
Western philosophy illuminate an intrinsic shadow of
the perennialist endeavor. The theoretical unification
attempted by perennialism retains the essential
character of totalizing modern philosophical systems
rooted in the Enlightenment age: Diderot and
Dalembert’s Encyclopaedia (1751), Laplace’s (1809)
system of the world, Hegel’s (1807) synthetic system,
and Comte’s (1835) law of three stages, to name a
few. Perennialism presents its theories of everything
as advances, when in fact their structure reflects an
anachronism that has not come to terms with the
otherness turn. Perennialism retains the modern
view of theory as a map, philosophy as “the mirror
of nature” (Rorty, 1979), and the pretension to locate
Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness

knowledge outside of the intersubjective space (cf.
Ferrer, 2017). This account contrasts with a view of
theory as a toolbox (Foucault, 1994a), philosophy
as an invitation, knowledge as a relational and
situated task. When considering these ideas in the
transpersonal context, the contrast is between on
one hand a conception of spiritual doctrines as
descriptive or representational and on the other as
a relational matrix of hermeneutical locations that
include descriptive and representational elements as
well as exhortative, soteriological, and prescriptive
ones (cf. Ogilvy, 2013).
To give a specific example, in Indian
philosophy, the exhortative and soteriological
dimension is primary and prevalent over the
descriptive and representational one. As Menon
et al. (2018) explained, “The focus of metaphysical
discussions in Indian philosophical literature is on
how to create a dynamic and continuous process
of spiritual uplift that is not distanced or alienated
from the lived experiences of the person" (p.
24). Another example is to be found in Banerji’s
(2018) clarification of how Sri Aurobindo’s integral
endeavor must be understood:
Thus integrality in Sri Aurobindo’s integral
yoga must not be thought of as a Theory of
Everything that explains the cosmos and claims
to hegemonize the field of yoga, but rather a
process psychology leading to an aporetic
experience of integral consciousness and future
supramental possibility, for which mind has no
language. (p. 30)
Transpersonal perennialist models such as
Wilber’s integral theory do not acknowledge such
a distinction appropriately. In the attempt to create
a unified theory from an ontological (descriptive
and representational) perspective, several mistakes
are made. First, the original traditions presumably
integrated in the perennial map are distorted in
order to force them to fit (Berkhin & Hartelius, 2011;
Ferrer, 1998, 2002; Hayes, 1994; Kremer, 1998;
Richards, 1978). Second, some philosophical and
scientific knowledge used to bolster parts of the
perennialist map are equally distorted (Bauwens,
2005; Falk, 2009; Meyerhoff, 2010), and some
unfounded claims of scientific consensus are
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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affirmed (Meyerhoff, 2010). Third, essential dialogue
with the current members of the involved traditions
is omitted, being especially poignant the case of
many indigenous traditions that are often situated in
the lower rungs of the perennialist developmental
scheme (Kremer, 1998). Fourth, the direct translation
into Western categories of the categories and
concepts used in non-Western spiritual frames
constitutes an epistemic, colonialist reduction that
simplifies the original terms into familiar Western
classifications, thereby stripping them of much of
their richness and otherness. The following quote by
Rothberg (2000) explained this problematic instance
of the “imperialism of the Same”:
To assume that the categories of current western epistemology are adequate for interpreting
[non-Western] spiritual approaches is to prejudge the results of such an encounter, which
might well lead to significant changes in these
categories. (pp. 175–176)
In the same vein, Ochs (2006) affirmed that
religious studies will remain colonialist as far as that
they “tend to remove ‘religious phenomena’ from the
contexts of their societal embodiments and resituate
them within conceptual universes of our own
designing” (p. 126; cf. Hammer, 2001). In addition to
other shortcomings, then, the unification attempt is
essentially colonialist in nature.
In addition to the problems associated to
the attempt at theoretical unification, the ultimacy
claim is also problematic. Affirming that a specific
experience or a specific stage of development is
ultimate is not affirming anything about that specific
state or stage, but about all the other states and
stages: these are necessarily less (less relevant, less
valuable, less high, less evolved, etc.). The claim of
ultimacy is a comparative and universal claim that
has a totalizing character. Thus, it is subject to the
aforementioned “imperialism of the Same”: once one
affirms ultimacy, one will feel a strong tendency to
dismiss anything that challenges it. The human psyche
is prone to the transition from “how things really are”
to “how things really should be.” This is what Vattimo
(1999), drawing on Derrida’s (1978) previous works
on “violence and metaphysics” pointed to when
he concluded that every metaphysical ultimate is
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potentially violent. In my view, what Vattimo stated
is that affirming any metaphysical ultimate places
ontology over ethics.
Nonetheless, this argument calls for a
distinction, lest any claim of ultimacy fall into
this dilemma and all notions of ultimacy become
meaningless. When a claim of ultimacy is
accompanied by a claim of uniqueness, that is, with
the claim that a specific ultimate is ontologically
the only ultimate, then the problem manifests in
all its seriousness. That is the case with perennialist
theories; an example is the way the notion of
enlightenment is treated, in concomitance with its
confused importation from Eastern traditions, in
some New Age circles (Jacobs, 2020). However, if
ultimacy is relational rather than ontological, then
a multiplicity of ultimates that occur in a variety of
relational contexts are simultaneously admitted (cf.
Ferrer, 2002). Moreover, in a relational context, any
ultimate necessarily takes the character of a yet-toexplore ultimate rather than a clear-cut theoretical
ultimate, because a relational matrix is constantly
shifting in ways that brings forward novelty.
Another problematic aspect from the lens
of otherness concerning the ultimacy claim points
toward ethical inconsistencies. If one takes a specific
achievement (e.g., nondual realization) as the
ultimate spiritual realization, once a human being
has achieved it there will not be any other aspects to
develop. This assumption stands in contrast with the
cases of extremely unethical behavior of some gurus
who have allegedly achieved this nondual realization.
Especially poignant are the cases of supposed masters
that Wilber had previously endorsed as realized
nondual masters (Conway, 2007; Yenner, 2009).
This problem led Wilber to complexify his model
by distinguishing multiple lines of development, yet
if there is a single nondual ultimate, then all these
lines must converge and meet in that ultimate, and
a nondual realization would necessarily reflect an
ultimate realization of each and every developmental
line. It would therefore seemingly be impossible for
a master with a complete nondual realization to fall
short in any developmental line, including ethical
development.
This is not to suggest that perennialist
authors have failed to wrestle with otherness.
Fernandez-Borsot

Analyzed from the stance of the lens of otherness,
the five modalities of perennialism can be viewed
historically as successive efforts at the integration
of otherness—as if the evolution of perennialism
was being pushed by the requirement for integrating
otherness. The first or basic variety (beginning of
20th century until the 1980s) posits that there is
only one path and one goal. Apparent variations are
irrelevant and correspond to cultural modulations.
In this case, diversity is devalued, and with it,
otherness: if others have experiences which differ
from the model, then they are plainly wrong, or not
on the path.
The second variety, esotericist (beginning
of 20th century until the 1990s), posits that there
are many paths but only one goal. By valuing the
diversification of paths, it introduces an implicit
valuation of otherness: if the others have a different
experience is just because they are in a different
path. Nonetheless, as all the paths must converge
to the one goal, experiences differing significantly
from this one goal (e.g., indigenous accounts) will
be labeled as distant from the goal. The third or
typological form (1930s to 1980s) admits many
paths and many goals, but only as instances of a
finite number of basic types. Diversity is admitted
but limited.
The fourth or structuralist type (1990s to the
present) posits many paths and many goals in surface
structures that correspond to one path and one goal
in regard to the deep underlying structures. In this
case diversification is introduced also at the level of
the goals, creating more space for otherness.
However, with the need of characterizing
the deep structures and distinguishing which
elements are surface and which elements are deep,
associated problems appear: who establishes what
is surface and what is deep? It is often someone
outside of the relevant spiritual frames who claims
to discern the difference. Others are then told how
they should interpret their experience. The fifth
kind of perennialism, perspectivist (1990s to the
present), posits many paths and many goals, and
the unification relies only on the affirmation that this
diversity corresponds somehow to different aspects,
perspectives, or dimensions of the same underlying
spiritual ultimate. This variety of perennialism is
Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness

otherness compliant to the degree that the unifying
spiritual ultimate remains free from description in
ontological terms. Taylor’s (2016, 2017a, 2017b,
2017c) soft phenomenological perennialism would
be a more spacious version of this variety, but it still
presents some ontologizing (Ferrer, 2017).
Significantly enough, only structuralist
and perspectivist versions of perennialism, which
present a better integration of otherness, have
persisted within the transpersonal field. Even the
most relevant version of structuralist perennialism,
Wilber’s integral theory (2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2007),
has been described in successive phases (Kazlev,
2009) that also display a progressive integration of
otherness (for details, see Fernandez-Borsot, 2017,
pp. 212–232). Taylor’s (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c)
recent version of perspectival perennialism, which
he has called soft perennialism, is in turn the most
otherness compliant version of perennialism to
date. Accordingly, it deserves a specific lens-ofotherness-based analysis.
Soft perennialism presents two distinctive
features: (a) spiritual development is conceived
as an open-ended process, with no goal, and
(b) phenomenology is prioritized over ontology
(Taylor, 2016). Using the lens of otherness, these
two distinctive features represent an important step
forward. The first feature is an explicit renunciation
of the ultimacy claim, and the second softens
the problems associated with ontologizing that
are present in the theoretical unification attempt.
Indeed, the phenomenological turn that Taylor
proposed can be interpreted as a move toward
respect for otherness: the phenomenological
analysis starts from the experience of the individual,
whatever that maybe, and attempts to honor and
respect it. The fact that Taylor has repeatedly
emphasized the secondary role of ontology can
be seen as a safeguard against the tendency to
impose a priori statements on the experience of
the other, an effort to avoid the “imperialism of the
Same.”
Nonetheless, his articulation still presents
clear efforts at ontologizing by claiming that the
most fundamental ground of being can be best
described as an all-pervading spiritual force,
which is claimed or assumed to be immanent and
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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impersonal (Taylor, 2016, p. 29). Following this line
of reasoning, descriptions of a spiritual ultimate in
any other terms—for example in transcendent or
personal terms—would also reference this same
underlying force, but with added elements that are
not ontologically present. The problems associated
with Taylor’s ontological claims have been analyzed
in depth by Ferrer (2017) and Hartelius (2016b,
2017a, 2017b, 2017c), and here I merely emphasize
implications from a lens of otherness stance. If the
impersonal quality of this speculatively posited
ultimate ground of being is emphasized over other
qualities, and if the attribution of any personal
quality to the spiritual ultimate is seen as an artificial
addition, then intersubjective relationships are
intrinsically devalued. Yet there is a problem of
otherness here: if any transpersonal experience,
however interpreted, is defined as being actually an
encounter with an impersonal ground of being, this
dismisses the possibility of having an experience in
which something larger than the self is encountered
as relational love (cf. Levinas, 1961).
Accordingly, while Taylor’s (2016) soft
perennialism is the most otherness compliant version
of perennialism, it still retains some problems relative
to ontologizing an impersonal, immanent spiritual
realm or force. This issue notwithstanding, his
research into the phenomenology of certain types of
developmental experiences may point to important
commonalities in postconventional development
(e.g., Taylor, 2010).
Participatory Thought
Through the Lens of Otherness
he application of a participatory perspective
in transpersonal studies arose in response to
problematic aspects of perennialism (Ferrer 1998,
2000, 2002). In contrast to perennialist thought, a
participatory approach expresses a commitment to
respect and honor the specificities and particularities
of each spiritual frame, each individual and each
community—inspired, as it were, by an ethos
of otherness. Consonant with this full respect
of otherness, participatory thought provides a
philosophical container for diversity rather than a
unified theory. It supplies a frame in which there
is space for any spiritual frame to exist on its own
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terms, minimizing the need of reinterpretation
relative to any other knowledge frame outside of
it—other than the implicit and central challenge
to any totalizing ontologies such frames may posit.
This goal is achieved by holding each spiritual frame
as a particular enaction of the infinite potentialities
that spirituality offers. Each enaction is brought
forth into manifestation through a process of cocreation within a specific social, historical, and
environmental context.
In a participatory approach, each spiritual
frame is like an ecosystem. Each ecosystem is a
specific, located manifestation of the potentialities of
biological life. Though there are many commonalities
between ecosystems (e.g., the ubiquitous presence
of cells as fundamental constitutive elements), there
is an imaginative diversity that so permeates these
systems that one could not claim they reflect a “core
ecosystem” of what is essential to all ecosystems.
Indeed, any claim of an essential core would be a
reduction of the inherently propagating diversity.
Abstracting similarities from various phenomena
remains a useful tool for comprehending and
controlling complex systems to a certain level, but
ontologizing these abstracted categories into any
kind of essential structure marginalizes or even
denies the ways in which the mapping process falls
short of the territory.
For example, a participatory perspective will
certainly acknowledge that it is perfectly valid for
Christians to worship the Trinity. The Trinity is not
just a social construction, an invention, or a fantasy;
within the Christian spiritual world it has ontological
richness and status. Yet just as ecosystems are
not isolated from one another, so socially located
spiritual domains interact and engage with other
domains—both spiritual and secular. A Christian
who adopted a participatory stance would refrain
from interpreting other traditions inside a Christian
framework—which would constitute assimilation—
and would resist attempting to prove that other
spiritual frames are incorrect or false—which would
constitute annihilation. This stance does not mean
that critiques cannot be developed, but rather that
critiques deserve to be accompanied by genuine
curiosity and dialogical engagement instead of the
a priori assumption that one specific spiritual frame
Fernandez-Borsot

depicts “ultimate reality” more fully than another
(cf. Duckworth, 2014). Moreover, in alignment with
Levinas’s (1984/1989) call for ethics and not ontology
to be the first philosophy, the criteria proposed by
Ferrer (2011b) to develop critical discernment when
approaching any spiritual frame focus on pragmatic
results, such as the correction of eco-socio-political
injustice and the overcome of ego-centeredness,
rather than on doctrinal-ontological matters. As
such, critiques of spiritual frames developed by a
participatory approach will emerge from critical
engagement with ethical considerations rather than
from ideological claims.
Consideration of spiritual frames as enactions
frontally contrasts with the perennialist approach
(cf. Ferrer, 2008). While perennialism attempts
to provide a map with specific slots where each
spiritual frame is assigned, a participatory approach
provides an open container where each spiritual
frame can find its place or places in relationship,
respecting its own specificities and those of others
while offering grounds for cross-cultural inspiration
and criticism. Whereas perennialism provides a shelf
with a box for each spiritual frame, a participatory
approach brings an infinite blank canvas where
each tradition can express and represent itself, with
the sole condition of ethical considerations such as
leaving space for others to disclose theirs. While
perennialism attempts to reduce all traditions to a
single theory, a participatory approach brings a frame
in which even totalizing theories are contextualized
within a permissive diversity. It is in this way that
a participatory approach encourages respect for
otherness: it integrates the pole of difference within
the play of similarity-diversity by calling for each
spiritual frame to be respected in its integrity in
return for abstaining from levying judgments on
other frame—other than ethical critiques of its
claims for ultimacy beyond its own community,
or respectful engagement over the impact of its
doctrines or practices on human wellbeing.
The similarity pole of otherness, and the
relational ground in which similarity and diversity
arise, also need to be integrated within a participatory
stance. Otherness without similarity can lead to
either relativistic indifference or tribalism, but a
participatory approach encourages an engaged
Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness

relationality that responds to similarity with curiosity
and respect. The very fact of shared being—of
presence together in a shared world—provides
ground for similarity. A participatory approach
differs from typical postmodern approaches by
affirming that there is a shared world; yet it holds
back from ontologizing claims about the nature of
any such shared world. It is in this way that it moves
from relativistic to relational. At the same time, the
presence of a shared world needs to be referenced
in some way that acknowledges its existence in an
undetermined way. Ferrer (2011b) has referred to
this as “a dynamic and undetermined mystery or
generative power of life, the cosmos, and/or the spirit”
(p. 2), out of which all spiritual enactions—as well
as secular enactions—are brought forth, through the
co-creative participation of all the involved beings.
On one hand, this mystery is both dynamic—that
is, not fixed—and undetermined. These qualities
imply that the mystery cannot be described through
any set of characteristics or attributes beyond those
embodied in its plural enactions; it transcends any
conceptual definition, it defeats any theoretical
unification attempt. On the other hand, it is not any
kind of “something,” and therefore, while it can be
diversely apprehended through direct experience,
it cannot be comprehended. Humans enact this
mystery through spiritual expressions, and at the
same time cannot capture its full potential with
those expressions because we are immersed—
participating—within it.
At the same time, participatory thought
does not see the mystery and its enactions as
separate entities. Continuing with the metaphor of
ecosystems, it does not make sense to see physical
ecosystems as separate from the processes that
shape them. Equally, the mystery is not distinct
from its enactions, nor reducible to any of them.
By pointing this idea, participatory thought avoids
a neo-Kantian dualism between the mystery and
its enactions, which might spur competition among
spiritual frames for the status of being less separated
from the mystery (Ferrer, 2017).
Given that all spiritual enactions are posited
to be brought forth out of the mystery, it provides
a certain sense of unity in the diversity: a unity not
in terms of a common end-point, but of a shared
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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yet undetermined ground. It is in this sense of a
unifying principle that Ferrer (2002, 2008, 2017)
spoke of a “relaxed spiritual universalism.” This
universalism can account for similarities among
traditions in a way that acknowledges the similarity
pole of otherness: the different enactions of the
mystery are not merely incommensurable realities,
totally independent from each other. They arise
from a shared ground, result from hybridizations
of previous enactions, and continue to be involved
in processes of hybridization (Ferrer, 2009; Ferrer
[2017] has acknowledged at least seven kinds of
equivalences among traditions).
In this way a participatory approach
enables unity through otherness by acknowledging
a common relational ground (the mystery),
while providing an intellectual strategy to accept
difference without compromising the integrity of
one’s own spiritual frame. The mystery functions
as an evocative construct, exemplifying a yet-toexplore unknown. When current spiritual frames are
seen as specific enactions of the mystery that do not
exhaust its possibilities, the door is open for novel
forms of spiritual inquiry (Ferrer, 2003; Heron, 1998,
2006). Spirituality is much more than reproduction
of past inspirations; it is an ever-present invitation to
explore and co-create more and more possibilities
of the mystery: the unfolding unknown of existence
itself.
A participatory approach overcomes two
major problems of perennialism: the theoretical
unification attempt and the ultimacy claim. As
such, it is much more otherness compliant than
perennialism in any of its forms or iterations.
Considering that participatory perspectives arose in
a moment when the otherness turn in philosophy
had already influenced Western culture, it seems
possible that this same otherness turn may have
been part of the impulse that brought forth the
participatory endeavor.
Conclusion
he analysis of perennialism through a lens of
otherness has highlighted two problematic
aspects of perennialist assumptions: the theoretical
unification attempt and the ultimacy claim. The root
of the shortcomings can be summarized through

T
12

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

Levinas’s (1984/1989) assertion that ethics, and not
ontology, must be the first philosophy. Attempting
to provide a unified theory, as perennialism does,
puts ontology first—an exercise that exerts a
marginalizing pressure on those who do not fit
easily into the unified theory; these are fated to
distorted assimilation into a perennialist model or
complete dismissal as irrelevant on account of their
noncompliant particularities. This coercive influence
is what Levinas (1961) called the “imperialism of the
Same” (p. 28).
Though Levinas provided a synthetic
formulation of these arguments especially suitable
for the critique developed in this paper, he is only the
most visible member of a broad current in Western
philosophy. This current unfolded throughout
the 20th century, increasing the awareness of the
relevance of otherness, and extending its influence
to social sciences, to the point of promoting a
variety of critical perspectives rooted in otherness.
The relevance of this philosophical current suggests
that important trends of Western thought in the
20th century experienced what can be called an
otherness turn.
Given the salience of otherness, I have
argued that it can be used as the foundation for
a critical perspective of analysis, which I call the
lens of otherness. I have provided an outline of the
theoretical foundation for the lens of otherness and
have applied it to perennialism to show problematic
aspects of its fundamental assumptions. I have also
argued that the evolution of the perennialist thought
has appeared to respond to the need of improving
the integration of otherness. Even Taylor’s (2016) soft
perennialism, though more “otherness compliant”
than its predecessors, still retains the characteristic
problems of perennialism.
A participatory approach appears to more
fully remedy the problems identified in perennialism.
Indeed, the level of otherness compliance in
participatory approaches is such that one could
say they are inspired by an ethos of otherness, a
commitment to respect and honor the specificities
and particularities of each spiritual frame, each
individual, and each community. In this way, it may
be that the otherness turn of Western philosophy
can make substantial contributions to the debate
Fernandez-Borsot

on perennialism, showing that otherness is a key
consideration that unavoidably alters the terms of the
debate on its viability as a frame within psychology,
religious studies, or transpersonal studies. By
contrast, a participatory approach may be a more
viable philosophical frame for efforts to hold diverse
spiritual traditions in a relational rather than relativistic
frame—one that permits a discerning study of their
uniqueness and similarities as expressions of a shared
undetermined mystery.
Note
1. This paper is based in part on a dissertation
submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of
the PhD degree in Transformative Studies at the
California Institute of Integral Studies (CIIS). The
paper was completed during a term as visiting
scholar at CIIS. I wish to thank Glenn Hartelius
for helpful and valuable comments on earlier
drafts of this paper and for the scholar rigor he
has fostered in my work.
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